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TORT-GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-POLITICAL

SUBDIVISIONS-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court

held that the real estate exception to governmental
immunity contained in the Political Subdivision Tort
Claims Act was unavailable to the plaintiffs to bring
a cause of action against the City of Philadelphia,
where the plaintiffs' injuries were caused by the
criminal acts of a juvenile who had escaped from a
city-run juvenile detention center. Although the
negligent maintenance of the detention center may
have facilitated the juvenile's escape, the court held
that the plaintiffs' injuries were not directly related
to the condition of governmental property. Rather,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
injuries were caused by the acts of a third person,
and were therefore outside the scope of liability set
forth in the real estate exception.
Mascaro v. Youth Study Center,

Pa.

,523

A.2d 1118 (1987)

In 1982, Claude Opher, a juvenile, escaped from a city-run detention center for juvenile criminal offenders known as the Philadelphia
Youth Study Center [hereinafter Center].' Appellees' complaint al-

leged that, after Opher escaped, he and an accomplice broke into
the Mascaros' Philadelphia home. 2 While Opher and his accomplice
were burglarizing the house, the Appellees returned home and discovered the intruders. 3 Opher and his accomplice tied up Mr. and
Mrs. Mascaro and their young son Kenneth.4 While the accomplice
raped Mrs. Mascaro, Opher beat the Mascaros' young daughter
Michelle and then took her into her parents' bedroom where he

1. Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 523 A.2d 1118, 1119 (Pa. 1987).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Kenneth Mascaro was eight years old at the time of the attack. Brief
, 492
Pa. Commw.
for Appellants at 5, Mascaro v. Youth Study Center,
A.2d 786 (1985).

DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:827

raped and sodomized her for several hours.' Opher was tried and
convicted for his actions and received a sentence of incarceration of
50 to 150 years. 6 Mr. Mascaro, apparently unable to cope with the
memory and consequences of what had happened to his family,
committed suicide.7 Prior to his suicide, Mr. Mascaro and his wife,
both in their own right and as parents of their minor children, filed
a complaint against the Center, the City of Philadelphia, its then
managing director, Wilson Goode, and the Commonwealth of Penn8
sylvania.
In their complaint, the Mascaros claimed that the City of Philadelphia [hereinafter City] and the Center negligently maintained the
real estate under its care and control, thereby facilitating Opher's
escape and the Mascaros' subsequent injuries. 9 In their answers,
defendants denied the allegations of negligence, raised the affirmative
defenses of governmental and official immunity under section 8541
of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act 0 [hereinafter Act], and
requested a judgment on the pleadings." The trial court agreed with
the City and Center and, accordingly, entered a judgment on the

5. 523 A.2d at 1119. During the time that eleven year old Michelle was
being raped and sodomized, the other members of the Mascaro family, bound and
gagged in an adjoining room, were forced to listen to her screams. Brief for
Appellees at 7a; Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 523 A.2d 1118.
6. 523 A.2d at 1119.
7. Id. The Mascaros had been in individual and family psychotherapy for
at least two years after Opher's attack. Brief for Appellants at 5; Mascaro v. Youth
Study Center, 492 A.2d 786.
8. 523 A.2d at 1119.
9. Id. Specifically, the Mascaros contended that:
(1.) The Youth Study Center, as a building itself, was structurally defective
in its general inferiority and weaknesses of its locks, screens, windows, and
doors, as demonstrated by the many past successful escapes.
(2.) This was Opher's fourth escape from the Youth Study Center.
(3.) He had a juvenile record of 11 arrests, 4 convictions, and an adult record
of 3 arrests and one conviction for the same type of crime-sociopathic and
brutal sexual offenses committed on elderly women and young girls.
Brief for Appellees, Statement of the Case at 15, Mascaro v. Youth Study Center,
Pa.
, 523 A. 2d 1118.
10. Under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8541-8564 (Purdon 1982), the Pennsylvania Legislature granted governmental immunity to local agencies. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8541 (Purdon 1982),
subtitled, "Governmental immunity generally," provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable
for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by
any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.
11. 523 A.2d at 1119-20.
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pleadings against the Mascaros.' 2 Thereafter, appeal was taken to the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. 3
The commonwealth court concurred with the trial court that managing director Goode was immune from suit, but held that the
complaint did state a cause of action against the City and Center 4
under the exception to governmental immunity found at 42 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8542(b)(3) (Purdon 1982), 11 relating to the care,
custody and control of real estate by a local agency.' 6 By its order,
commonwealth court reversed the trial court's entry of judgment on
the pleadings and remanded the matter to the trial court for further
proceedings. 7 The City and Center then filed a Petition for Allowance
of Appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 8 and their appeal
was granted to consider the scope of the "real estate exception"' 19 to

12. The Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, Alfred
J. DiBona, Jr., J., entered judgement on the pleadings against the Mascaros. Mascaro
v. Youth Study Center, No. 6068, Order and Opinion (Court of Common Pleas,
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, Jan. 18, 1984). In his Opinion and Order, Judge
DiBona stated:
Pennsylvania law is well-settled on the issue of governmental immunity. The
cases have held that the negligence alleged (failure to adequately supervise a
juvenile detainee with known escape tendencies) is outside the waiver of

immunity found at 42

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 8542(b) and therefore bars

plaintiffs' claim as to the Youth Study Center, City of Philadelphia, and its
employee, Wilson Goode.
13. 523 A.2d at 1120.
14. Id.
15. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(b)(3)(Purdon 1982) provides:
(b) Acts which may impose liability.-The following acts by a local agency
or any of its employees may result in the imposition of liability on a local
agency: (3) Real Property.- The care, custody or control of real property in
the possession of the local agency, except that the local agency shall not be
liable for damages on account of any injury sustained by a person intentionally
trespassing on real property in the possession of the local agency. A [sic] used
in this paragraph, "real property" shall not include:
(i) trees, traffic signs, lights, and other traffic controls, street lights, and
street lighting systems;
(ii) facilities of steam, sewer, water, gas, and electric systems owned by
the local agency and located within rights-of-way;
(iii) streets; or
(iv) sidewalks.
16. "Local agency" is defined as, "[a] government unit other than the
commonwealth government. The term includes an intermediate unit." 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN.

§ 8501 (Purdon 1982).

17.

523 A.2d at 1120. See Mascaro v. Youth Study Center,
, 492 A.2d 786, 790 (1985).
18. 523 A.2d at 1120.
ANN.

19. The "real estate exception" is the popular name for 42 PA.
§ 8542(b)(3) (Purdon 1982).

Pa. Commw.

CoNs. STAT.

830
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local agency immunity, and whether such exception would bar an
20
action against the City and Center under these facts.
Justice Papadakos, writing for the majority of the court, began
his opinion by recognizing that the court had already found that the
Act 2' was a valid exercise of legislative authority under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 22 Justice Papadakos further recognized that, prior
to imposing any liability upon a local agency by way of any of the
legislatively enumerated exceptions to governmental immunity, 23 three
statutory requirements must be satisfied.2 First, the damages must
be such that they would be recoverable under common law or under
a statute that creates a cause of action against one not having
immunity. 25 Second, the injury must be caused by the negligent acts
of the local agency or its employee acting within the scope of his
duties. 26 Third, the injury must occur as the result of one of eight
acts described at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(b) (Purdon 1982).27

20. 523 A.2d at 1120.
21. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8541-8564 (Purdon 1982). In Ayala v.
Philadelphia Bd. of Public Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973), the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court abrogated the judicially created doctrine of governmental immunity.
In response, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the Political Subdivision Tort
Claims Act. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8541-8564. This Act legislatively raised
the shield of governmental immunity against any damages on account of any injury
to a person or property caused by any act of a local agency or employee thereof
or any other person, except as otherwise provided. Mascaro v. Youth Study Center,'
Pa. at
, 523 A.2d at 1120 (emphasis added).
22. 523 A.2d at 1120. See also Carroll v. County of York, 496 Pa. 363, 437
A.2d 394 (1981).
23. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8542(b) (Purdon 1982), contains eight
enumerated exceptions to governmental immunity.
24. 523 A.2d at 1121.
25. Id.
26. Id. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8542(a) (Purdon 1982) provides:
Exceptions to governmental immunity (a) Liability imposed.- A local agency
shall be liable for damages on account of an injury to a person or property
within the limits set forth in this subchapter if both of the following conditions
are satisfied and the injury occurs as a result of one of the acts set forth in
subsection (b):
(1) The damages would be recoverable under common law or a
statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person
not having available a defense under section 8541 (relating to governmental immunity generally) or section 8546 (relating to defense of official
immunity); and
(2) The injury was caused by the negligent acts of the local agency
or an employee thereof acting within the scope of his office or duties
with respect to one of the categories listed in subsection (b). As used in
this paragraph, "negligent acts" shall not include acts or conduct which
constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.
27. 523 A.2d at 1120.
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As for the first precondition, the Mascaros contended that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Ford v. Jeffries2 provided
the necessary common law analogy. 29 Relying upon prior case law30

28. 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111 (1977). In Ford v. Jeffries, the landlord of a
vacant dwelling house permitted the structure to become dilapidated. The house had
large holes in the windows, walls, and foundation and had become a haven for
rats, dogs, and arsonists. Two fires broke out in the structure, and the second fire
almost totally destroyed the next-door-neighbor's home which was located five or
six feet from the vacant house. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the landlord
of the firetrap responsible for the destruction of the neighbor's home. As such, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that:
a property owner can reasonably be expected to know that the visible conditions
of vacant property in a state of disrepair may attract, for various purposes,
children or adults, who, having entered the property, might act, either negligently or intentionally, in a manner that would cause a fire.
Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. at 593, 379 A.2d at 113.
29. 523 A.2d at 1121.
30. See Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395 (1957) (owner of a
loaded gun, who kept it in a place young children frequented, held liable for the
injuries suffered when a child found the loaded gun and shot his young cousin);
Anderson v. Bushong Pontiac Co., 404 Pa. 382, 171 A.2d 771 (1961)(The owner of
a used car lot held liable for damages incurred when a car was stolen by minors
and negligently driven, hitting a pedestrian and causing such injuries as to require
the amputation of her right leg. The car keys had apparently been stolen from the
car while located on the defendant's open lot. Defendant, who knew of the key
theft, did nothing to secure the car from theft. The court held that it was reasonably
foreseeable that the car would be stolen by youths who frequented the area.);
Churbuck v. Union R.R. Co., 380 Pa. 181, 110 A.2d 210 (1955) (An employer was
held liable for injury caused by its foreman who, while showing the plaintiff/
employee of an independent contractor how to remove ice from a railroad track,
accidentally struck the track with a pick causing a chip of the rail to strike the
plaintiff's eye. In accordance with RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 435(1) it was
held, to establish liability it is not necessary for the actor to foresee the exact
manner in which the injury occurred if the actors conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about harm to another.); McCarthy v. Ference, 358 Pa. 485, 58 A.2d 49
(1948)(Passengers were killed when a large boulder fell from a slope, owned by a
steel company, on to a bus that was traveling along a public road located beneath
the slope. Despite numerous landslides and falls of rock from the slope upon the
highway prior to the accident involving the bus, the company failed to exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances. In accordance with applicable case law and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 363, 364 and 365, the company was held liable,
even though the Public Service Commission had approved the original construction
and location of the road, and the Borough had accepted dedication of the highway.);
Nelson v. Duquesne Light Co., 338 Pa. 37, 12 A.2d 299 (1940)(In accord with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447, the court held that the fact that an
intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent
manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another where the actor's
negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, if the actor,
at the time of his negligent conduct, should have realized that a third person might
so act, or the intervening act is a normal response to a situation created by the
actor's conduct, and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent.);
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and the Restatement (Second) of Torts3 ' the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court agreed 2 and noted that Ford v. Jeffries does indeed stand for
the proposition that, at common law, liability is established where
one charged with the control and custody of property knows, or
should have known, that the property could be misused by persons
who commit crimes, and then fails to take precautions against
unreasonable risks that stem directly and indirectly from the property.
The contemplated acts of third parties whose crimes are facilitated
by the conditions of the property are included among the unreasonable risks against which precautions must be taken.33 Therefore, the
court agreed with Appellees that they had stated a cause of action
which could be maintained at common law, thereby satisfying the
34
first requirement set forth in the statute.

The second condition imposed by the statute" required that the
Mascaros demonstrate that their injuries were caused by the negligent
acts of a local agency or one of its employees acting within the scope

Welser v. United Gas Improvement Co., 304 Pa. 227, 155 A. 561 (1931) (Defendant's
employees carried a highly flammable substance onto the sidewalk in an uncovered
bucket and set it on fire. A policeman, in an effort to extinguish the fire, kicked
over the bucket, spilling its contents, and injury resulted to plaintiff who was
standing nearby. Held, the act of a third person (policeman intervening and contributing to a condition necessary to the injurious effect of the original negligence),
will not excuse the first wrongdoer (employer), if such act ought to have been
foreseen. The original negligence still remains a culpable direct cause of the injury.)
31. The court based its finding of negligence in part on RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 365 (1965), which provides that:
[a] possessor of land is subject to liability to others outside of the land for
physical harm caused by the disrepair of a structure . . . if the exercise of
reasonable care . . would have made it reasonably safe by repair or otherwise.
The court also cited § 448 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965), which
states that:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a
superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's
negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the
third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of
his negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such
a situation might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of
the opportunity to commit such tort or crime.
32. 523 A.2d at 1122-23.
33. Id. at 1121-22.
34. Id. at 1123. See supra note 26 for the text of 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 8542(a)(1) (Purdon 1982) wherein it is required that a cause of action must be
stated which could be maintained under common law (or statute) against one not
having the immunity defense in order for a local agency to be liable.
35. See supra note 26 for the text of 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(a)(2)
(Purdon 1982) wherein it is required that the "[ilnjury was caused by the negligent
acts of the local agency or employee thereof. . . ." Id.
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of his office or duties.3 6 However, under the statute, the local agency
cannot be held liable for crimes, actual fraud, actual malice, or
willful misconduct.1 7 The Mascaros contended that they satisfied this
second requirement by pleading averments that the City and Center
failed to secure the locks, doors, and windows of the Center, thereby
failing to prevent Opher's escape.3" The court acknowledged that the
Mascaros were not incorrect when they alleged that the negligent
repair of the Center was a cause of their injuries.3 9 Inasmuch as the
negligence of the City and Center was a condition necessary to the
Mascaros' injuries in the "but for" sense, the second statutory
requirement was satisfied/h
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then addressed what it perceived
as the most difficult question under consideration, i.e., "whether the
real estate exception to the Act exposes the City and Center to
liability coextensive with the liability imposed on private landowners. ' ' 41 The court prefaced its discussion of this key issue by noting
that 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(b)(3) (Purdon 1982) "represents
'42
an exception to the 'absolute rule' of governmental immunity
which is set forth in 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8541 (Purdon 1982).
Consequently, the court maintained that the real estate exception
must be narrowly interpreted particularly because it is, in fact, an
exception to immunity and the legislature expressly intended to
3
insulate political subdivisions from tort liability4
36.
37.

523 A.2d at 1123.
Id. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for the text of 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(a)(2) (Purdon 1982).
38. 523 A.2d at 1123. Appellee's complaint further averred that Opher had
escaped from Youth Detention Centers on three prior occasions, including a prior
escape from the Youth Study Center of Philadelphia, the facility at issue in this
case. Id. at 1122; Reproduced Record of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 6a-7a. The Court
omitted this information from their opinion.
39. 523 A.2d at 1123.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (emphasis in original).
43. Id. (citing Casey v. Geiger, 346 Pa.Super. 279, 499 A.2d 606 (1985)
("One must keep in mind that [§ 8542(b)(3)] is an exception to the general rule of
governmental immunity that is stated in § 8541. Therefore, a proper application of
the rules of statutory construction dictates a strict and narrow interpretation of the
eight categories of liability enumerated in § 8542(b)."); Vann v. Board of Educ. of
the School District of Philadelphia, 76 Pa. Commw. 604, 464 A.2d 684 (1983)("We
believe [§ 8542(b)(3)] must be read as a narrow exception to a general legislative
grant of immunity and we construe it to impose liability only for negligence which
makes government-owned property unsafe for the activities for which it is regularly
used, for which it is intended to be used, or for which it may reasonably foreseen
to be used.")
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited with approval prior commonwealth court decisions holding that a political subdivision's "duty
is to maintain [its] property safely for the activities for which it is
regularly used, for which it is intended to be used, or for which it
may reasonably be foreseen to be used." 44 In addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court articulated the requirement that "the conduct
or negligent act complained of must be directly related to the condition of the property. ' 45 The court clearly supported the holding
that the real estate exception 46 does not impose a standard of liability
on the political subdivision that is any greater than that of a private
4
landowner.
While a local agency may be held liable for injuries arising out of
its acts or the acts of its agents which make property in its care,
custody and control "unsafe for the activities for which [the property]
is to be regularly used or .. . foreseeably to be used, [the] . . .acts
of others . .. are specifically excluded from the general immunity
section 41. . . and are [not] discussed in the eight exceptions" to
governmental immunity. 49 The court concluded that on that basis
alone, harm caused by others "may not be imputed to the local
agency or its employees," 50 although such harm may be a breach of
a private landowner's duties for which the private landowner could
be held liable under the Ford v. Jeffries approach." Undoubtedly,
this represents a distinct difference between the duties and liabilities
of a local agency and those of a private landowner.5 2
44. 523 A.2d at 1123. The commonwealth court cases that were cited by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court are Vann v. Board of Educ. of the School District of
Philadelphia, 76 Pa. Commw. 604, 464 A.2d 684 (1983), and Vince v. Ringgold
School District, 92 Pa. Commw. 598, 499 A.2d 1148 (1985).
45. Citing Frank v. SEPTA, 96 Pa. Commw. 221, 506 A.2d 1015 (1986) and
Fizzano v. Borough of Ridley Park, 94 Pa. Commw. 179, 503 A.2d 57 (1986). In
Frank, 506 A.2d at 1017, the commonwealth court held that where the pleadings
fail to demonstrate a significant relationship between the alleged dangerous condition
of the property and the decedent's death, the real property exception is not triggered.
Additionally, in Fizzano, 503 A.2d at 58, the court stated that the conduct complained of must be directly related to the condition of the property.
46. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(b)(3) (Purdon 1982).
47. 523 A.2d at 1123.
48. Id. at 1124. The "general immunity section" is found at 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8541 (Purdon 1982). See supra note 10 for the text of § 8541.
49. 523 A.2d at 1123. The eight exceptions are listed at 42 PA. CoNs. STAT.
ANN. § 8542(b)(l)-(8) (Purdon 1982).
50. 523 A.2d at 1123.
51. Id. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's approach in Ford v. Jeffries, 474--Pa. 588, 379 A.2d
111.
52. 523 A.2d at 1123.
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The court was persuaded by the line of cases refusing to apply the
real estate exception to negligence claims involving a failure to
adequately supervise the conduct of students or other persons. 3 Those
54
cases, according to Justice Papadakos, had been correctly decided
and dictated that:
[T]he real estate exception can be applied only to those cases where it
is alleged that the artificial condition or defect of the land itself causes
the injury, not merely when it facilitates the injury by the acts of
55
others, whose acts are outside the statute's scope of liability.

The majority then noted that the legislature's language contained
in section 854156 clearly precludes the imposition of liability on either
itself or its local agencies for the acts of third parties.5 7 The legislature

53. Id. at 1124, citing Davies v. Barnes, 94 Pa. Commw. 145, 503 A.2d 93
(1986)(real property exception to governmental immunity inapplicable where plaintiff's claim was that student who was killed while joy-riding in vehicle that was
being worked on by auto shop class was not adequately supervised by school
officials); Messina v. Blairsville-Saltsburg School District, 94 Pa. Commw. 100, 503
A.2d 89 (1986)(alleged negligence of school district had to do with the lack of
supervision of the schoolchildren and not the care, custody or control of the parking
lot where plaintiff cheerleader fell and was injured during unsupervised practice
session in the school yard); Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 93 Pa. Commw. 87,
500 A.2d 520 (1985)(action by plaintiff against city not within real property exception
to governmental immunity where gravamen of complaint concerns failure of city to
provide adequate security personnel for the benefit of those using its facilities);
Acker v. Spangler, 92 Pa. Commw. 616, 500 A.2d 206 (1985)(action against school
district barred where personal injury action was based on school district's failure to
supervise employee who allegedly pulled out a table from under plaintiff who was
seated thereon and not on failure to correct dangerous condition of table itself);
Usher v. Upper St. Clair School District, 87 Pa. Commw. 461, 487 A.2d 1022
(1985)(alleged negligence of chemistry teacher in failing to control the area around
an experiment thereby causing burns to student's face from flaming chemical was
not related to care, custody, or control of real property and school district was not
precluded from raising immunity as a defense); Robson v. Penn Hills School District,
63 Pa. Commw. 250, 437 A.2d 1273 (1981)(action relating to injury to eye of
student caused by pencil which had been thrown by classmate while teacher was out
of classroom and class was unsupervised does not fall within the real property
exception); Wimbish v. School District of Penn Hills, 59 Pa. Commw. 620, 430
A.2d 710 (1981)(action based on student's injury which occurred during school
activity and was allegedly caused by school district's negligence in failing to employ
trained personnel, supervise its employees properly, and provide prompt medical
attention is clearly outside the limited waiver of governmental immunity for actions
relating to the care and control of property).
54. 523 A.2d at 1124.
55. Id. (emphasis in original).
56. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8541 (Purdon 1982). See supra note 10 for
the text of this section.
57. 523 A.2d at 1124.
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has not waived immunity for such third party actors or their acts in

any of the exceptions enumerated in the statute. 8
In addition to the legislature's judgment not to waive governmental
immunity for the acts of third parties,5 9 the majority pointed out
that barring liability for such acts is consistent with the "general
rule" 6 and prior case law6 ' which stand for the proposition that
criminal and negligent acts of third parties are superseding causes
which absolve the original actor from liability for the harm caused
by such third parties. 62 The court further corroborated its position
58. Id.
59. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that, according to the court's
own interpretation of governmental immunity, as expressed in Carroll v. York, 496
Pa. 363, 437 A.2d 394 (1981), it is within the province of the legislature not to
waive governmental immunity. In Carroll v. York, the court held that the concluding
sentence of article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is the controlling
provision with respect to the constitutionality of legislatively established immunity.
It states as follows: Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner
and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct. PA. CONST. ART I, § 11.
Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the legislature has authority
to confer tort immunity upon political subdivisions. 437 A.2d at 398.
60. 523 A.2d at 1124.
61. Id. In so finding, the court cited the following cases: Feld v. Merriam,
506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984)(landlord has no general duty to protect tenants
against criminal intrusion); Miller v. Checker Yellow Cab Co., 465 Pa. 82, 348
A.2d 128 (1975)(extraordinary negligent conduct of a second actor will be superseding
cause and insulate antecedent tortfeasor from liability); Estate of Flickinger v.
Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 305 A.2d 40 (1973)(intervening negligent act will not be a
superseding cause relieving the original negligent actor from liability if that actor,
at the time of his negligent conduct, should have realized that another person's
negligence might cause harm); Liney v. Chestnut Motors, Inc., 421 Pa. 26, 218
A.2d 336 (1966)(where auto repair shop left a customer's auto double-parked on
the street with the keys in the ignition for over three hours, an auto thief's act of
stealing and carelessly driving the stolen auto was a superseding cause of pedestrianplaintiff's injuries resulting from being struck by the auto while the thief was driving
and defendant repair shop was not negligent with respect to the plaintiff); Green v.
Independent Oil Co., 414 Pa. 477, 201 A.2d 207 (1964)(where landlord negligently
repaired hoist that leaked oil on to floor and an individual subsequently cleaned
the floor with a gasoline and kerosene mixture thereby causing an explosion and
injuries leading to death, the landlord was not liable because the intervening cause
of the explosion was the use of the flammable mixture and not the leaking hoist);
Kite v. Jones, 389 Pa. 339, 132 A.2d 683 (1957)(where second actor has become
aware of the existence of a potential danger created by the negligence of the original
tortfeasor, and thereafter, by an independent act of negligence, brings about an
accident, the first tortfeasor is relieved of liability because the condition created by
him was merely a circumstance of the accident and not its proximate cause); DeLuca
v. Manchester Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co., 380 Pa. 484, 112 A.2d 372 (1955)(an
act of negligence which created a dangerous condition does not give rise to a right
of recovery if the harm was in fact caused by an intervening act of negligence which
was a superseding cause).
62. 523 A.2d at 1124.
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by noting that the legislature, in enacting 42

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 8542(a)(2) (Purdon 1982),63 had determined that the criminal acts,
actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct of its own agency
or employees within the scope of their duties are not the subject of
suit or liability. 64 Accordingly, the court stated that it would be
incongruous to shield the City or Center from liability for the crimes
of its agents and employees while, at the same time, imposing liability
65
for the crimes of others.
The majority was clear in its opinion that the legislative scheme
of immunity that is set forth in the Act" consistently excludes all
criminal acts from liability 67 including claims arising out of the acts
of a criminal such as Opher, who took advantage of defects in the
property of a political subdivision to commit crimes."1 In short, a
political subdivision cannot be held liable for any criminal act, even
if it is the condition of its property which facilitated the injury
forming the basis of the claim. Therefore, in a seven to one decision,
the court reversed the order of the commonwealth court and reinstated the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
69
County.
Justice Hutchinson in a short concurring opinion, emphasized that,
based on these facts, the City and Center would be insulated from
liability for negligence because, while the omissions of the City and
Center may have been the cause-in-fact of the injuries suffered by
the Mascaros, their negligence in failing properly to secure the Center
was not the legal cause of the harm due to the intervening criminal
acts of Opher. 70 Since the Mascaros had to show that both cause-infact and legal causation were present in order to recover on a
7
negligence theory, their claim failed. '
Justice Larsen filed the sole dissenting opinion. At the outset,
Justice Larsen noted that he agreed with the commonwealth court
and part II and III of the majority opinion of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court 2 which ruled that the Mascaros had stated a cause

63. See supra note 26 for the text of 42
(Purdon 1982).

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

64.

523 A.2d at 1124.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. AN. §§ 8541-8564 (Purdon 1982).
523 A.2d at 1124.
Id.
Id. at 1124-25.
Id. at 1125 (Hutchinson, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. (Larsen, J., dissenting).

§ 8542(a)(2)
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of action which could be maintained at common law against a person
who did not have an immunity defense available, 73 and that the
requisite causation under the Act was present. 74 However, Justice
Larsen was unable to agree with the majority's denial of recovery
which was based on "[an exceedingly narrow, and unwarranted,
construction of the 'real estate exception' of the Act. . .. -7"Additionally, Justice Larsen noted that the City and Center's negligent
care, custody, and control of its property led to the predictable and
foreseeable criminal acts of Opher and the consequent injuries of the
Mascaros. 76 Applying a "but for" causation analysis, Justice Larsen
concluded that, "but for" the Appellants' negligence, the brutal
criminal acts perpetrated against the Mascaro family would not have
77

occurred .

Justice Larsen quoted the majority's interpretation of the real
estate exception which provides for recovery against a local agency
where its acts or the acts of its employees make the property unsafe
for the activities for which the property is regularly used, is intended
to be used, or may reasonably be foreseen to be used. 7 According
to Justice Larsen's reasoning, the Center is really a prison, i.e., a
place to detain violent and delinquent juvenile offenders, 79 and it is
73.

Id.

74. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(a)(2) (Purdon 1982). See supra note 26
and accompanying text. Justice Larsen agreed with the majority's statement that,
"when Appellees alleged that the negligent repair of the Center was a cause of the
injuries to them, they were not incorrect." 523 A.2d at 1123. Justice Larsen noted
that this finding was proper and amply supported by the sections of the Restatement
and prior decisions of the court that were set forth in the majority opinion as well
as by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 ("Tortious or Criminal Acts the
Probability of Which Makes Actor's Conduct Negligent"), the comments thereto,
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B ("Risk of Intentional or Criminal
Conduct") and the comments thereto.
75. 523 A.2d at 1126.
76. Id.

77. Id. Justice Hutchison, in his concurring opinion, stated that:
I write separately to emphasize that, on these facts, a proximate cause analysis
would insulate Appellants from liability from negligence. The Appellants'
negligence, in failing to properly secure a juvenile detention center, may have
been the cause-in-fact of the injuries suffered by the Appellees. However,
Appellants' omissions are not the legal cause of the harm due to the intervening
criminal acts of Odger [sic.]. Both cause-in-fact and legal causation must be
present for a plaintiff to recover on a negligence theory.
Id. at 1125.
78.

Id.

79. Id. at 1127. Justice Larsen describes "Youth Study" Center as a "fanciful
designation", noting that,"the real property in question here was not a boy scout
camp . . . it was a detention center, a jail, a prison; a place to hold violent and
delinquent offenders. . . ." Id.
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intended to be used for imprisoning young offenders to avoid tragedies like the one that befell the Mascaros. 0 Therefore, because the
care, custody, and control of the Center was negligent, and the
property was rendered unsafe for the activities for which it was
regularly used, was intended to be used and was reasonably foreseen
to be used, the Mascaros should have been allowed to recover for
their injuries proximately caused by that negligence.81
By way of illustration, Justice Larsen analogized the Center to a
municipal reservoir.8 2 If a municipality negligently cared for a reservoir, and due to that negligence the reservoir burst and caused
property damage one mile down the road, that negligence would fall
within the real property exception and the municipality would be
liable for the damage caused by the water that had been unleashed.83
The resulting property damage would have been a foreseeable and
predictable result of the municipality's negligence.8 4 In the instant
case the City's negligence in maintaining the Center permitted a
dangerous instrumentality (the offender Opher) to be "unleashed"
thereby causing foreseeable and predictable harm to individuals (the
Mascaro family) located outside of the property.8 5 If the negligence
of the municipality caused foreseeable damage for which the City is
not immunized by the real estate exception for actions arising out of
such negligence in the reservoir case, it should likewise not be
86
immunized in the Mascaros' case.
Justice Larsen viewed the majority's construction of the Act as
based on an invalid, implied limitation that the majority "somehow
glean[ed]" from a newly-announced principle of construction.8 7 The
implied limitation is that an injury, must be caused by the artificial
condition or the defect in the property itself before the real estate
exception may be applied. 88 When the artificial condition or defect
merely facilitates the injury by the acts of others, the real estate
exception is inapplicable under the majority approach. 89 According
to Justice Larsen it is only through this newly-announced and miserly

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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principle of construction of the Act that the majority is able to
support this implicit limitation.9
While the majority's construction of the Act was based on the
principle that an exception to a rule of immunity must be narrowly
interpreted to be consistent with legislative intent, 9' Justice Larsen
viewed such a narrow rule of construction as ignoring and trampling
upon the constitutional rights guaranteed to citizens by the Pennsylvania Constitution, 92 particularly because implied limitations are not
found in the language of the Act. 93 In fact, Justice Larsen opined
that the Act itself violates the Pennsylvania Constitution by denying
and/or limiting the recovery of damages, justice, and the right of
remedy to individuals who have been injured due to the negligence
of local agencies and municipalities. 94 To minimize the constitutional
damage inflicted by the Act, Justice Larsen would broadly construe
the eight exceptions to tort claims immunity and provide the fullest
possible coverage. 95 Interestingly, Justice Larsen quoted sections of
Justice Papadakos' dissenting opinion in Smith v. Philadelphia96 to

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. Justice Larsen cites PA. CONST. art. I, § 11 and art. III, § 18. Art.
I, § 11, states:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law and right
and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought
against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases
as the legislature may by law direct.
PA. CONST. art. III, § 18 provides in pertinent part:
[Other than Workmen's Compensation ... in no other cases shall the General
Assembly limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or
for injuries to persons or property....
93. 523 A.2d at 1127.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1127-28.
96. Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 512 Pa. 129, 516 A.2d 306 (1986)(Papadakos,
J., dissenting, and joined by Larsen, J.). Ironically, just six months prior to filing
the majority opinion in the instant case, Justice Papadakos filed a dissenting opinion
in Smith v. City of Philadelphiain which he maintained that, under the Pennsylvania
Constitution, everyone is guaranteed a remedy for his injuries and an open court
in which to air grievances. 512 Pa. at 146 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Duff v.
Keenan, 347 Pa. 574, 33 A.2d 244 (1943); Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21
Pa. 147 (1853)). Relying on the PA. CONST. art. I, § 11 and art. III, § 18 (the same
sections cited by Justice Larsen in Mascaro), as authority, Justice Papadakos
expressed the opinion that the legislature may only create a separate procedure for
the litigation of cases where the legislature or its subdivisions are involved. The
legislature has been limited by the constitutional reservation by the people of the
right to obtain a remedy by due course of law for injury sustained. Smith v. City
of Philadelphia, 512 Pa. 129, 144-50, 516 A.2d 306, 315-18.
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clarify the constitutional mandate that all people, without exception,
should have remedies for injuries.9 7
Justice Larsen concluded his dissenting opinion by accusing the
majority of "active participation in [a] legal conspiracy that denies
the right of remedy for injuries done to our citizens." 98 Justice
Larsen's position is that caring for those the government has injured
is the greatest function and the most honorable pursuit in which the
government can engage. 99 Justice Larsen found the majority's narrow
construction of the Act to be "an insult to civilization" and a
violation of the trust that the court has accepted to protect the
peoples' rights.100
The history of sovereign immunity is permeated by controversies
such as the one that arose in this case between the majority and
Justice Larsen. It is a classic controversy between the interests of the
government which wants to function efficiently and unrestricted by
costly tort claims, and the interests of private individuals who have
been injured as a result of negligence by the government or its
employees.' 01
The dominant concern of the proponents of governmental immunity has been the protection of public funds'0 2 through
the avoidance of costly tort judgments that could lead to either a
curtailment of services or an extreme tax burden. 103 Immunity has
also been viewed as a necessary shelter from tort claims because local
governments often engage in necessary, high-risk activities that private
entities refuse to undertake.104 Proponents of the doctrine have argued
that the government ought to be protected against tort claims resulting
from such activities. 05 Additionally, it has been feared that exposure

97. 523 A.2d at 1128.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See generally Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1963); Sloan, Lessons in ConstitutionalInterpretation: Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania, 82 DIcK. L. REv. 209 (1978); Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3), 34 YALE L. J. 1 (1924-25); Van Alstyne,
Government Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A. L. RFv. 463
(1963); Kennedy and Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign Without Immunity, 36
S. CAL. L. REv. 161 (1963).

102. See e.g., Ford v. Kendall Borough School District, 121 Pa. 543, 549, 15
A. 812, 815-16 (1888).
103. Id.
104. Lajeunesse, The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act: Pennsylvania's
Response to the Problems of Municipal Tort Liability, 84 DICK. L. REv. 717, 720
(1980)(hereinafter "Lajeunesse").
105. Id.

DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:827

to liability would encourage litigation'06 and inhibit aggressive governmental action.1 7
Critics of governmental immunity have expressed the view that
exposure to liability deters government carelessness and irresponsibility.10 8 In addition, such critics have argued that municipalities have
a greater capacity than individuals to absorb the losses that are
caused by the operation of government. As such, rather than forcing
injured individuals to bear these losses, the government ought to pay
and then distribute the costs efficiently by passing them on to the
taxpayers. Opponents of immunity, applying a cost-benefit analysis,
have asserted that the increased tax burden should be viewed as a
necessary price of the benefits received by the taxpayer from the
governmental activities that gave rise to the liability.' °9 It has also
been argued that the availability of liability insurance ameliorates
any anticipated drain on the public purse." 0
Most historians believe that sovereign immunity in the American
states originated as a carry-over from the English doctrine that "the
King could do no wrong."" I By the time of Henry III in the midthirteenth century, it was settled feudal law that the King could not
be sued in one of his own courts without his consent." 2 In the mideighteenth century, Blackstone included in his commentaries the
concept that the crown, as the embodiment of the modern state,
3
could not be sued without its consent."
During the twentieth century, government expanded into almost
every facet of American life and this expansion was accompanied by

106. See e.g., Carr v. The Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324, 329-30 (1860).
107. See Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 101 at 178.
108. See e.g., Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Public Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 599,
305 A.2d 877, 884 (1973).
109. Id.
110. See Laughner v. County of Allegheny, 436 Pa. 572, 579, 261 A.2d 607,
610 (1970)(Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
111. See James, Tort Liability of Government Units and Their Officers, 22
U. Cm. L. REv. 610 (1955).
112. Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 479 Pa. 384,
, 388 A.2d
709, 710 (1978). See also James, supra note 111.
113. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 254-55; see id. at 240-242 (the King as the
embodiment of the state). Blackstone did state, however, that the crown would, as
a matter of course, permit itself to be sued, id. at 255, and he devoted a chapter
to remedies for wrongs committed by the King. Id. at ch. 17. Nonetheless, in the
case of Feather v. The Queen, 6 B. & S. 257, 295, 122 Eng. Rep. 1191, 1205 (Q.B.
1865), the maxim that "the King can do no wrong" was again applied and it was
decided that servants of the crown could no longer, as a matter of right, obtain
redress against the crown for wrongs it had committed.
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a proportionate increase in the number of injuries caused by the
government. 114 The harshness of the governmental immunity doctrine
became more acute as the size of government grew and its activities
became more pervasive." 5 Contemporaneously, traditional theories
underlying the fault concept of liability began to change" 6 . While
individualism and self-reliance remained important concepts in the
social policy foundation of tort law, the principle of "social insur-7
ance" began to achieve acceptance among legal scholars and judges."
Additionally, there was a widespread acceptance of the respondeat
superior doctrine,1 8 and a greater willingness to expand liability
generally." 9 The movement toward a tort system based on "equitable
loss distribution" was gaining momentum. 20
Changing social policies and scholarly criticism caused various
jurisdictions to remove the protection of governmental immunity.

114. See generally Borchard, supra note 101. Professor Edwin Borchard is
considered by many to have been the leading commentator and historian in the area
of sovereign immunity. His writings were influential in the movement against
immunity.
115. Id.
116. See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YALE L. J. 549 (1948); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MICH. L.
REv. 41, 48-49 (1949); Van Alstyne, supra note 101, at 471-72; Lajeunesse, supra
note 104, at 720-21, wherein it is stated:
The fault concept shifts the burden of loss suffered from the injured
party to the person who caused the injury. This approach focuses attention
on the moral quality of the conduct of the individual participants. In some
cases, as a consequence of the desire to encourage unfettered enterprise and
competitive activity for the promotion of the general welfare, the value of the
conduct outweighs the harm it inflicts. The individual victim then must bear
the burden of the loss.
Tort liability systems based on a policy of "social insurance", however,
operate on the theory that the most efficient way to deal with human accident
loss is to assure the victim of some measure of compensation and to allocate
the cost to society as a whole. If a certain type of loss is the almost inevitable
by-product of a desirable activity, the more equitable treatment is to distribute
the cost among the beneficiaries of the activity. The morality at issue, then,
is a more generalized social morality. Workmen's compensation, no-fault
systems, and the growth of liability insurance are symptomatic of a movement
toward this risk theory of tort liability.
117. Id.
118. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77
HARv. L. REv. 209, 210 (1963); Lajeunesse, supra note 104, at 720-21; But see
Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't. of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 397-98, 388 A.2d 709, 715
(1978).
119. See Lajeunesse, supra note 104, at 721.
120. "'Equitable loss distribution' is the terminology generally used to designate a system based on the principle of 'social insurance'...." Id. at n.25. See
also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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New York was the first jurisdiction to respond when it waived
sovereign immunity in 1929121. In 1945, the New York Court of
Appeals held that the New York Court of Claiins Act of 1929 was
applicable to municipal corporations, as well as the state government.1 22 Tort immunity was abolished by the federal government,
with certain notable exceptions, when, in 1946, Congress passed the
Federal Tort Claims Act. 123 By 1977, thirty-one states had at least
partially abolished sovereign immunity by judicial action. 124 However,
the legislatures in most jurisdictions enacted statutes to replace some
25
areas of immunity that were judicially abrogated.
Although sovereign immunity had been discussed in Pennsylvania
cases as early as 1788,126 the first Pennsylvania case that actually
adopted sovereign immunity was the 1851 case of O'Connor v.
Pittsburgh. 27 During the next 122 years, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was solidified in Pennsylvania through the process of stare
decisis. 121 Judicial precedents were often mechanically applied and
frequently resulted in illogical and inequitable results. 129 The practical

121. See N. Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1929).
122. Bernadine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
123. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, ch. 753, 60 Stat.
842 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976)).
124. Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't. of Highways, supra note 118 at 387 n.4,

citing K.C. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies, Section 25.00 (1976 & Supp.
1977).
125.

Lajeunesse, supra note 104, at 722, citing Harley & Wasinger, Govern-

mental Immunity: Despotic Mantle or Creature of Necessity, 16 WAsHBURN L. J.
12, 33 app. (1976); Kennedy, Tort Liability and Sovereign Immunity: An Overview,
19 Municipal Attorney 194, 196-98 (1978).
126. Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357 (Pa. 1788)(denying claim for the
value of goods seized during the Revolutionary War by agents of Commonwealth).
127. 18 Pa. 187 (1851). In O'Connor, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that municipalities were parts of the commonwealth and denied relief to a Catholic
church whose property had been damaged due to the altering of the grade of a city
street. According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
At the declaration of American independence, prerogatives which did not
concern the person, state, and dignity of the king, but such as had been held
by him in trust for his subjects, were assumed by the people here and exercised
immediately by themselves; among the rest, unwisely I think, the prerogative
of refusing to do justice on compulsion ....
Yet it must be admitted that,
while it is inequitable to injure the property of an individual for the benefit
of the many, it would be impossible for a corporation to bear the pressure
of successive common law actions for the continuance of a nuisance, each
verdict being more severe than the preceding one.
Id. at 189.
128. See Lajeunesse supra note 104, at 724.
129. Id.
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application of the doctrine eventually strayed far from its original
underlying policies. 3 0 In 1973, Pennsylvania joined numerous other
states when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court judicially abolished
governmental immunity13 in Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Public
Educ. 3 2 The Ayala court noted that the doctrine of governmental
immunity was "devoid of any valid justification' ' 3 3 and that "no
reasons whatsoever exist for continuing to adhere to the doctrine. . .. ,,34 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that since
the doctrine had been judicially imposed, it could be judicially
terminated, 35 and it completely removed the protection against tort
claims that had previously been given to political subdivisions. For
purposes of tort liability, local governments were placed in the same
36
position as individuals and private corporations.
Local officials eventually began to express concern that this new
exposure to tort liability was subjecting municipal officials to a large
number of lawsuits and that legislation was needed to fill the gap
created by Ayala. 3 7 Additionally, such officials also feared the then
unknown and undefined scope of municipal liability, 38 particularly
after they considered the high cost of liability insurance.3 9 In some
cases liability insurance was not available at all. 14°
130. Id. at 725-26.
131. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
132. 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973). For a thorough analysis of the Ayala
decision, see Note, 25 MERCER L. REv. 969 (1974).
133. 453 Pa. 584, 587, 305 A.2d 877-78.
134. Id. at 592, 305 A.2d at 881. The court also noted that, "Whatever may
have been the basis for the inception of the doctrine, it is clear that no public policy
considerations presently justify its retention." Id.
135. Id. at 600, 305 A.2d at 885. The court then quoted the Illinois Supreme
Court's language in Molitor v. Kaneland Community District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d
11, 25, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (1959), where that court stated "[wle closed our courtroom
doors without legislative help, and we can likewise open them."
136. Lajeunesse, supra note 104, at 729. Justice Roberts stated, "Recently,
this Court reiterated the prevailing philosophy that liability follows tortious conduct ....
Appellee offers no reason - and we are unable to discern one - for
permitting governmental units to escape the effect of this fundamental principle."
Ayala, 453 Pa. at 594, 305 A.2d at 882.
137. See Commonwealth of Pa. Local Government Commission, A Working
Paper - Municipal Tort Law in Pennsylvania; Analysis and Recommendations,
Preface, 17 (1977); Testimony on S. No. 1477 Before the House Commission on
Local Government (Aug. 21, 1978)(statement on behalf of Pa. State Association of
County Commissioners at 1).
138. Testimony on S. No. 1477 Before the House Commission on Local
Government (Aug. 21, 1978) (statement on behalf of Pa. State Association of
County Commissioners at 1). "Because of that case [Ayala], no one knows what is
or is not an act which can be challenged." Id.
139. Lajeunesse, supra note 104, at 730.
140. Id. See Testimony on S. No. 1477 Before the House Commission on
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Some local officials resented the judicial movement away from
governmental immunity. 4' Many believed that the necessary stabilization of the boundaries of tort liability could only effectively occur
through comprehensive legislation. 42 They favored shifting the policymaking role from out of the hands of the courts and back to the
legislature. 43 Such a shift actually occurred when the Pennsylvania
Legislature passed the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act of
1978.' 4
As early as 1980, at least one commentator noted that the ambiguous language contained in the real estate exception 145 "fosters speculation concerning the extent of a municipality's liability."' It was
questioned whether the phrase "care, custody or control of real
property" 147 was intended to include liability arising from activities
associated with real property as well as liability caused by the physical
attributes of property. 48 An argument could be made that the "care,
custody or control" language should be interpreted to include activities occurring on the property because the legislature could have
further limited liability by using the more restrictive "dangerous
49
condition" language which is found elsewhere in the Act.
This argument is less persuasive, however, when one considers that
the legislature did not expand the Act to include the use or control

140. Id. See Testimony on S. No. 1477 Before the House Commission on
Local Government (Aug. 21, 1978)(statement on behalf of Commonwealth of Pa.
Insurance Department at 2-3), wherein it was stated that, "underwriters are all too
aware that doctrines of immunity, and the scope and bases of liability can shift
drastically at any time, thus exposing them to serious and totally unanticipated
losses. This is one of the principal reasons why companies have generally avoided
this market." Id. at 3.
141. Testimony on S. No. 1477 Before the House Commission of Local
Government (Aug. 21, 1978) (statement on behalf of Pa. State Association of
County Commissioners). "Courts are continually stripping away the immunity of
government units and officials." Id. at 2.
142. Testimony on S. No. 1477 Before the House Commission on Local
Government (Aug. 21, 1978) (statement on behalf of Commonwealth of Pa. Insurance Dept.). In fact, one insurance official referred to the problem as "the shifting
sands of case law." Id. at 3.
143. Lajeunesse, supra note 104, at 730.
144. The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act of 1978, P. L. 1399, No. 330,
§§ 101-803 (now codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8541-8564 (Purdon 1982)).
145. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(b)(3) (Purdon 1982).
146. Lajeunesse, supra note 104, at 744.
147. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(b)(3) (Purdon 1982).
148. Lajeunesse, supra note 104, at 755.

149.
1982).

See 42

PA.

CoNs.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 8542(b)(4), (5), (6) and (7) (Purdon
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of machinery and tools and the maintenance or control of recreational
and athletic events despite the fact that critics of the Act attempted
to persuade the legislature to expand the Act in these areas.' 50 In
addition, the plain meaning of the statutory language,"' an earlier
draft of the legislation,' 5 2 and pre-Ayala common law' are all
consistent with a more restrictive interpretation of the statute.
Justice Larsen's constitutional argument'5 4 appears to be the
only
adequate reasoning available to those who would hold the government
liable for injuries stemming from activities on government property
as well as injuries arising from the condition of the property itself.
That argument is not only a minority position, but it has also lost
the support of the only other Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice
that had subscribed to Justice Larsen's constitutional interpretation.'5 5
In its effort to perpetuate the doctrine of governmental immunity,
the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted a
strained interpretation of article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 5 6 While the first sentence of the section would seem
to guarantee a remedy to everyone for their injuries5 7 by limiting
the legislature's power to diminish the rights of the people to seek

150. Lajeunesse, supra note 104, at 745-46. See C. Evans, Suggested Amendments to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act 1 (Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers
Association 1979 Convention Materials).
151. "Words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar

and according to their common and approved usage..

"

1 PA.

CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 1903 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
152. Pa. S. No. 1477, Printer's No. 2163, Session of 1978, § 203.
153. See Cousins v. Butler County, 73 Pa. Super. 86 (1919). In Cousins, an
inmate of the jail in Butler County, Pennsylvania, leaned against an iron railing at
the top of a stairway which gave way, causing him to fall and sustain injuries for
which he sought to recover. The court held that the government was shielded from
liability by governmental immunity.
154. See supra notes 75-100 and accompanying text.
155. Interestingly, Justice Papadakos, the author of the majority opinion in
Mascaro, had six months earlier dissented in Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 516
A.2d at 314. In that case, Justice Papadakos adopted the position that "[tlo the
extent. that [the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act] attempts to create a shield
of immunity for injuries caused, I would hold those sections to be unconstitutional."
Id. at 316. Peter Papadakos, Justice Papadakos' law clerk, explained the apparent
inconsistency to this writer. He stated that some judges will adopt a minority
position and dissent "until the cows come home." However, according to Mr. Peter
Papadakos, Justice Papadakos is not that kind of judge. Justice Papadakos now
recognizes that Smith v. Philadelphia is the rule of law in Pennsylvania and he has
modified his position accordingly. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 92.
157. See Commonwealth ex rel. Duff v. Keenan, 347 Pa. 574, 33 A.2d .244
(1943); Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853).
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redress for their injuries, the court has recently interpreted the second
sentence as vesting authority in the legislature to raise the shield of
government immunity when it so desires.'5 8 The court has not been

consistent in their interpretation of this section of the constitution.
In fact, it has been the subject of a "raging judicial debate" for
many years. 5 9
Currently, the court favors an interpretation in which the second
sentence of the section, qualifies and limits the mandatory language
of the first sentence. The reasoning of the court is that since the
second sentence grants to the legislature the power to regulate the
manner, the courts, and the cases in which suits may be brought
against the commonwealth, the framers intended that the legislature
should have complete control over such cases. 16° Therefore, according
to this line of reasoning, since the legislature has complete control,
it can abolish altogether the right to recover against the common-

wealth in tort actions.161 Another interpretation, however, seems more
plausible.
Alternatively, the second sentence of the section can be interpreted
as only giving the legislature the right to implement procedurally the
substantive rights absolutely granted by the first sentence.1 62 Article

158. For an eloquent denunciation of the constitutional interpretation permitting governmental immunity, see Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 512 Pa. 129,
516 A.2d 306, 314-19 (Papadakos, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 315. In Smith, Justice Papadakos noted the inconsistent judicial
interpretation of the second sentence of article I, § 11 when he stated as follows:
This court has, at times, ruled that this sentence created a basis for
immunity from suits against the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions.
Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 868 (1973); Commonwealth
v. Orsatti, Inc., 448 Pa. 72, 292 A.2d 313 (1972); Conrad v. Commonwealth,
Dep't. of Highways, 441 Pa. 530, 272 A.2d 470 (1971); Meagher v. Commonwealth, 439 Pa. 532, 266 A.2d 684 (1970); Bannard v. New York State
Natural Gas Corp., 404 Pa. 269, 172 A.2d 306 (1961); Stouffer v. Morrison,
400 Pa. 497, 162 A.2d 378 (1960); Commonwealth v. Berks County, 364 Pa.
447, 72 A.2d 129 (1950). At other times we have ruled that this section creates
no immunity from suits in favor of the Commonwealth or its subdivisions.
Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't. of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709
(1978)(abolishing sovereign immunity); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ.,
453 Pa 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973)(abolishing local government immunity); Falco
v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971)(abolishing parental immunity);
Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965)(abolishing
charitable immunity).
160. See Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 516 A.2d at 309.
161. Id.
162. Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 582-83, 305 A.2d 868, 876
(1973)(Manderino, J., dissenting). Justice Manderino stated as follows:
Section 11 has two sentences and they must be read together.

RECENT DECISIONS

19881

I of the Pennsylvania Constitution is a Declaration of Rights, and
each of the sections contained therein limits the state's ability to
withhold particular rights. 163 Therefore, it seems incongruous to interpret the second sentence of the section as protecting the rights of
the state. 64 As Justice Papadakos has stated:
Nothing is clearer to me than the plain, untechnical language of
section 11. It simply guarantees that all people shall have remedies for
their injuries without exception. Sentence two merely gives the legislature the option of creating special Courts, Boards and Tribunals to
handle controversies where they or their instrumentalities are parties. 65
The Mascaro family was certainly denied a remedy for their injuries. I66 Considering the current composition of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, other innocent individuals will, similarly, bear the
unabated hardship caused by governmental negligence unless the
Pennsylvania Legislature repeals the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims
Act. Powerful interest groups would certainly oppose any such repeal,
167
as well as consequential expansion of government tort liability.
Therefore, in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act, combined with public officials' strong opposition to
further expansion of government tort liability, neither judicial nor
legislative relief seems likely in the future.

The first sentence of section 11 is unequivocal. It protects everyonewithout exception-for all injuries. It specifically speaks of injuries to lands,
goods, person or reputation. The first sentence says that everyone shall have

remedy by due course of law-it does not say that sometimes there is a remedy
and sometimes not. The sentence states that right and justice shall be administered without .

.

. denial-it does not say justice can be denied sometimes

and sometimes not. The first sentence of section 11 must be read before
proceeding to sentence two, and that first sentence could not have been written
in more absolute terms even by one possessing divine rights. Can we possibly
destroy the absolutely plain meaning of sentence one by an interpretation of
sentence two, which requires a reach outside the people's written constitution?
The written constitution contains no mention of immunity for the state-or
inherent rights of the state-or inalienable rights of the state-or indefensible
rights of the state. It is thus necessary for the majority to begin interpretation
of sentence two by reaching outside the written constitution. Just where that

reach extends, we are not. told.
Id. (emphasis in original).
.163.

Smith, 512 Pa. at

164.
165.
166.
167.

Brown, 453 Pa. at 581, 305 A.2d at 875 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
Smith, 512 Pa. at
, 516 A.2d at 317 (Papadakos, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 137-143 and accompanying text.

,516

A.2d at 316.
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Given the ever-increasing number of felons who are incarcerated
in aging and often outmoded detention facilities, it will not be
surprising if, in the future, there is a corresponding increase in the
number of escapes from such facilities. Because political subdivisions
are not held liable for the injuries and damages caused by escaped
inmates, maximum vigilance is not encouraged. If the City of Philadelphia had been held liable in the Mascaro case, and had a jury
awarded the family two or three million dollars in damages, one can
assume that the City would have reassessed the existing deficiencies
in their detention centers with at least a somewhat more critical eye
and addressed the problems with a bit more fervor. The threat of
liability may be a more effective catalyst toward change than the
headlines that appear in the newspapers for a few days after an
escaped felon commits an abhorrent crime.
Marc L. Sternberger

